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Abstract—This problem is a series of biddings and auctions.
Each round of bidding and auction are different from previous
ones because of the change of network topology, variance of
budget set by the sender, and possible evolution of strategies
of other nodes. The huge strategy space of relay nodes makes
the formulation to a game very difficult. We present a brief
qualitative analysis in this paper, and propose a bidding strategy
based on learning algorithms.
I. PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATIONS
In this paper, Section I to III describe proposed scheme
which competed in MANIAC competition, section IV briefly
reports the performance of this scheme, lessons learnt from
the competition is concluded in section V.
Both AP and Handhelds auction off the traffic load for-
warding service with the same elements: budget, fine, time
out, source and destination. As the forwarding task has no
information of the auctioneer in it, thus downstream entity
1 adapts strategies without care the auctioneer being AP
or handheld. For convenience of analysis, we generalize a
recursive auction process as shown in following figure,
u i dS D
Fig. 1. A recursive auction chain
S and D are APs, which denote source and destination
respectively. u, i, and d represent upstream node, the node
being discussed, and the downstream node respectively. Figure
1 shows a generalized situation. We denote the bid to upstream
node, budget and fine of advertised auction of a node i with
bi, Bi, and fi respectively.
II. GENERAL ANALYSIS
A. What should an industrious node do to accumulate money
and successful transmissions
We now analysis the behavior of node i. According to rules.
when there is a routing request heart, node i has to bid. Clearly,
there are two possible outputs for i, to win the bid, or to loss.
We use a function PwinBid to represent the result of auction.
PwinBid has output of 1 and 0, which denote i gets and losses
the bid respectively. PwinBid is influenced by the i’s bid, along
with the bids from the other neighbors of the auctioneer u,
1we use entity or node to denote either AP or handheld
so PwinBid can be written as PwinBid(bi, b−i), where b−i means
the biding strategies taken by the neighbors of u except for i.
Because of mobility, the set {−i} is different in each round.
When node i wins the bid, it starts to consider how to
forward the packet. We use PtaskSucceed to denote whether the
packet is successfully transmitted or not, which is denoted by
1 and 0 respectively.
Now we can express the balance of node i as following2
u =
PwinBid[PtaskSucceed(bi − bd)− (1− PtaskSucceed)(fu − fi)] =

fi − fu if PwinBid = 1, PtaskSucceed = 0
bi − bd if PwinBid = 1, PtaskSucceed = 1
0 if PwinBid = 0
bi −BS if PwinBid = 1, then piggyback
bi − fu if PwinBid = 1, then do nothing
(1)
From the above possible outcomes of different situations,
we can see that the first and last scenarios produce positive
balance when fu is not very high, but there is little possibility
to be allowed by competition organizers. The second scenario
where i wins bid and afterwards successfully transmit the
packet causes profitable outcome for i, thus becomes the most
favorable situation. In order to achieve this, node i needs good
strategy to struggle for the bid, and then wisely choose the next
hop which helps transmit the packet successfully with a higher
possibility.
III. SKETCH OF STRATEGY
A. Auction
Find next hop to forward packet. Neighbors’ ability of
forwarding packet is decided solely by time out time timeout
and the distance between neighbor and destination dist.
Working with OLSR routing scheme, when a node has a
packet to forward, it knows the minimum number of hops
(denoted as dist) to the destination by looking at its routing
table (the hop counts in the corresponding entry). It is easy
to know that, among its neighbors, the maximal minimum
number of hops can not exceed dist+ 1.
• If timeout ≥ dist + 1, delivery is an easy task, choose
the neighbor with the smallest bid.
2New rule from competition organizer: An upstream node pays the accepted
price to the chosen downstream node if the packet has been delivered
successfully to the final destination, not immediately after the deal.
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• If timeout = dist, delivery is a risky job, choose the next
hop which is closet to destination in order to improve the
possibility of successful delivery.
• If timeout < dist, delivery is mission impossible, set
budget randomly, choose any neighbor, and set fine as
high as budget.
The budget is set as follows,{
bi × dist/timeout if timeout ≥ dist
bi if timeout < dist
(2)
where bi is the biding price of i to win the bid from upstream
node. The idea is if timeout is larger than dist, which means
this forwarding task can be finished safely and the motivation
of forwarder is thus higher, then nodes will still be happy to
forward the packet even with less payoff.
1) Fine: If budget is too low (the fine is accordingly low),
the next hop may possibly drop the packets and cause huge
loss for i whereas its own loss is limited. If we set fi as
bi − , where  is a small value, then the budget should be
max{fu/2, bi×dist/timeout}, in this case, if next hop node
d drops the packet, it will pay at least fu/2 back to you, and
thus both of i and d loss the same amount (You avoid being
played by malicious node).
B. Bid
For node i, if the timeout in the routing request from node
u is smaller than its dist, then i’s bidding price will be set
as Bu. The idea behind is that i is not willing to be chosen
for this mission impossible. If timeout ≤ dist, i needs to
make effort to win the bid. The only way to win is to bid
with smallest bidding price, to achieve this, we combine two
learning schemes.
1) Prediction with supervised learning and historic records:
In this scheme i needs to predicts the bidding prices of the
other nodes hearing the same request (its competitors in this
auction). This task is hard to do as some competitors may
not be i’s neighbors and thus i is unaware of them, but we
argue that i’s neighborhood provides adequate similar samples
to predict auctioneer’s neighbors after winning several bid
successfully. In order to do so, i needs to collect the pair
of routing request from auctioneer and corresponding bidding
prices. We assume that there exit a fixed pattern that the other
nodes deciding their bidding prices based on the heart budget.
Exactly speaking, i maintains a table for all the other nodes
about their bidding history. Then a simple machine learning
scheme (regression on the basis of training examples obtained
in previous auctions) is used here to obtain the possibly
minimum bidding price pmin−i of others. Then i will choose
its bidding price bi slightly smaller than pmin−i . If i fails to win
this bid, it will become more aggressive (with lower bidding
price) to compete next time, which means the price will be a
certain factor higher.
There exists drawback in this scheme, which is in the initial
phase of prediction, there is only a few samples can be used
for regression, thus we propose the other scheme to improve.
2) Regret learning scheme: There are several components
in this unsupervised learning scheme:
• We set 10 biding price levels bi,1, bi,2, bi,3, bi,4.., bi,10,
where bi,x = B ∗ x/10, in order to work with finite
solution space.
• R: Regret matrix, 10×10, which stores regret value from
different actions.
• Potential: Potential set, 10× 10, Potential(a, b) is the
change of utility when i changes price from action a to
b.
• Regret matrix evolves with the game continues:
Rr+1i = (1−
1
r + 1
)×Rri + Potentialr
where r is the packet forwarding round index.
R1i is randomly decided, and then involves based on
the above formula. We design a heuristic way to decide
Potential:
Assume in the first round (r = 1), node i chose bid price
bi,3 and fails to win, then it won’t help if i increased its biding
price, so we set potential of this change as negative x−3 where
x < 3, if i increase its bidding price, then it will possible for
i to win, so the potential is set as Potential(3, x) = 10 − x
where x > 3.
When i wins the bid with bidding price bi,3, it can secure
the bid by decreasing its biding price (using bi,1, bi,2), but its
income will be decreased, thus decreasing its biding price is
not favored, we set Potential(3, x) = x − 3 where x < 3,
when i increases its biding price, it is possible to lose the bid,
so potential is also set to be negative as Potential(3, x) =
3 ∗ (3− x) when x > 3. Note we add a coefficient 3 here to
emphasis the serious outcome of increasing biding price.
In each round r, node i choose the biding price which poses
the biggest regret in the regret matrix.
3) Combine the results from two schemes together:
The adopted bidding price of i is min{bi,x, Bu ×
(dist/timeouts)n}.
C. Behave aggressively
The above analysis doesn’t consider the ultimate purpose of
the competition: to defeat all the other competitors with more
money earned (or packets successfully delivered), instead, it
only focuses on its own welfare. To win the competition,
node i should act more selfishly to avoid helping greedy
competitors (upstream node which set low budget) make big
money whereas itself only gets the changes. So in case the
budget is low, i would simply drop the packet and cause big
loss to the upstream (may not be the immediate previous one)
and endure a slight loss in the same time.
1) Drop packet when the budget is too low: Question: If
I drop the packet purposely, will I get revenged maliciously
some time later?
as the the price of revenge is not trivial (the node taking
revenge may need to pay considerable fine upwards), so
revenge is not an good option for any node. In a word, if
we can deduce there is one greedy upstream node exists, we
can safely drop the packet.
We assume all the other participates have the same conclu-
sions as us.
2) Avoid giving bid to ’rich’ node: When being auctioneer,
we try to not give the bid to the component which is successful.
To achieve this, we need to keep records of each node which
wins a bid from the very beginning of the competition. Based
on the same argument for biding price prediction, we assume
any other node winning a bid is heart by either of our two
devices.
For our node i, it maintains tables of revenues for all rivals.
For example, the table for rival a on node i is:
transactionID auctioneerID revenue
2 m Bm ∗ µ− fm ∗ (1− µ)
· · · · · · · · ·
7 n Bn ∗ µ− fn ∗ (1− µ)
where µ is as follows,{
timeout/dist if timeout < dist
1 if timeout > dist (3)
Note that according to the rules, in one transaction (packet
transmission), any node can at most win bid for once, that is
why there is only one auctioneerID in each row. Two devices
from the same team merge their table together when they
become neighbours.
D. Communication between team mates
• share history records on others’ bidding prices and accu-
mulated revenues.
• give team mate priority when deciding who will win the
routing req from it.
IV. PERFORMANCE IN COMPETITION
A. Introduction of the real competition setting
The access points are deployed in two floors in one teaching
building. The mobile ad hoc network is composed with 10
tablets from 5 participant teams and two tablets from orga-
nization team. Each tablet is held by one person who walks
randomly and freely in the two floors covered by signals from
access points. There are totally 50 access points, and each
tablet averagely catches 3 to 8 access points. There are 3
rounds of competitions. Each lasts 10 minutes and there is
time between rounds for adjustment.
B. Performance
In the first round we didn’t adopt the aggressive model
(III-C1) and exclude the possibility that the packets sent from
access points are with small budget, because we thought
this would discourage the forwarding willingness of nodes
and finally result in low ratio of successful transmission.
Unfortunately, large amount of packets with small budget were
seen. Our tablets won most bids. The new budget set in our
routing request is decided by Formula 2, as timeout used in
the competition is big (20, meanwhile the number of hops
is 1 to 4 or 5), thus the new budget is very small even the
won packets are with high budget. As a result, most packets
forwarded by us are dropped by next hops. In one word, our
tablet suffered a big loss of fine.
In the second and third rounds, we dropped the packets with
small budget (smaller than 30% of the maximal budget) thus
experienced minor loss. After winning a auction, we set higher
budget and accordingly high fine for the packet, (more than
50% of the previous budget), which refrains the downstream
nodes to drop packets easily. Although deficit is alleviated
compared with the first round, we noticed the low success
ratio of transition. The reason is we didn’t pay attention to the
forwarding ability, or forwarding willingness of downstream
nodes, so that the transmission failed and we got fined.
V. LESSONS LEARNT
• Auction strategy
For participants: In case the budget is low, raise bid
price to avoid being chosen, in case the budget is high,
make sure the new budget is not too small.
For system: packets sent from APs should not be as-
signed with low budget.
• Bidding strategy
We won a big fraction of routing quests that are heart,
which illustrates our bidding strategy works quite well,
and is adaptive to other nodes’ bidding behaviours.
• Choosing next hop
The willingness of next hop node should be considered
carefully, our scheme which chooses next hop solely
based on bidding prices doesn’t perform well. Although
the mechanism deciding the willingness is unknown,
it is safe to assume the deciding mechanism is static,
then it is possible to evaluate nodes’ willingness for
forwarding based on historical record. Based on the
setting of competition, we are aware whether the next
hop node forwards packet by waiting for the BID WIN
sent from the next hop. We give each other node one
value called willingness. If BID WIN is not heart, which
means the packet is either gets dropped, or the next
hop doesn’t have neighbours, then we label this node
as non-cooperative and willingness− = 1, or cooperative
if the BID WIN is heart, then willingness+ = 1. This
willingness can be used as metric to choose the next hop
in next transmission. As the ad hoc network is small and
dynamic, it is easy to accumulate considerable number of
records for each neighbour. A more complex and possibly
efficient way could be: find a function deduced from
history, which produces the probability that the node is
cooperative or not given a budget, then decision can be
made based on the probability in next transmission.
• Participates only care their own interests, and system-
wide consideration is not necessary and improper.
All the related work recently [1] discuss forwarding
strategies with an assumption that, all the nodes have the
same deciding mechanism on auctioning and bidding. As
participating teams exploit orthogonal mechanisms and
common notions don’t exist, it is difficult for ingenious
algorithms to achieve good performances in this competi-
tion. This competition can be seen as a highly demanding
scenario for forwarding strategies.
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